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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY-A PROCEDURAL ANOMALY
In 1907, State v. Copenhaver' decided for Montana the fundamental
procedural question whether there may be a valid conviction of second de-
gree burglary under an information specifically charging first degree bur-
glary. It was there concluded that such conviction would be invalid since
first degree burglary, burglary committed in the nighttime, does not in-
clude second degree burglary, that committed in the daytime. In 1952 the
Montana court came to the same conclusion again in State v. Fitzpatrick.!
In reaching the result in the Copenhaver case Justice Brantly also lim-
ited the duty of the jury imposed by Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, sec-
tion 94-7406, to find the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty,
at least in a burglary charge, to a case in which the state has charged the
"crime generally" without specifying the degree. This Note is an attempt
to show that these two cases were decided erroneously.
HISTORY OF THE RULE
Title 94, chapter 9, of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,' governs the
crime of burglary. The pertinent sections of the Montana burglary statute
are:
94-901. Burglary defined. Every person who enters any house,
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn,
stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, automobile, vessel, rail-
road car, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any
felony, is guilty of burglary.
94-902. Degrees of burglary. Every burglary committed in the
nighttime is burglary in the first degree, and every burglary com-
mitted in the daytime is burglary in the second degree.
94-905. Nighttime defined. The phrase "nighttime" as used in
this chapter, means the period between sunset and sunrise.
The decision of State v. Fitzpatrick" rested upon the fact that, although
the defendant was shown to have committed the crime there was a reason-
able doubt as to whether it was committed before sunrise, since it was not
proven by the state that it was committed in the nighttime as specifically
charged in the information. The court formally recognized that the crime
of burglary was divided into degrees, but insisted that under a specific
charge of first degree burglary, second degree burglary constitutes a separ-
ate and distinct crime not included in first degree burglary, thus prohibit-
ing a conviction, under the fundamental proposition that the defendant can
be convicted only for the crime charged.
The opinion of the Copenhaver case was written by Chief Justice Brant-
ly, and the situation was similar to that in the Fitzpatrick case-the defend-
ant, having been charged by information with the crime of burglary in the
first degree, was found guilty of burglary in the second degree, or burglary
in the daytime. The defendant appealed, contending that his conviction
'35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907).
2125 Mont. 448, 239 P.2d 529 (1952).
'Hereinafter the REVISED CODES OF MONTANA will be cited as R.C.M.
'125 Mont. 448, 239 P.2d 529 (1952).
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could not be sustained for the reason that he had been convicted of an of-
fense with which he was not charged. Brantly upheld this contention on
the premise that a charge of burglary in the nighttime does not include a
charge of burglary in the daytime since the charge by its very terms alleges
the aggravated offense, and thus excludes the notion that it was the purpose
of the prosecutor to charge the defendant generally. He stated:
Section 821 a Soo Code, 190 s gUs the crime into
two degrees and impose different punishments; but the degree of
the offense is a matter of proof, and is for the jury to determine
under proper instructions, as is provided in section 2145 of the
Penal Code. But when the pleader, as in this case makes the
specific charge of burglary in the nighttime, he not only unneces-
sarily narrows the scope of the inquiry, but he must be held to
proof of the charge as made; for though the crime is distinguished
into degrees, and the jury may convict the defendant of any offense
necessarily included in that with which he is charged (Penal Code,
sec. 2147), it is obvious that a charge of burglary committed in the
nighttime does not include a charge of burglary in the daytime, for
the reason that the charge, by its very terms, alleges the aggravated
offense, and thus excludes the notion that it was the purpose of
the prosecutor to charge the defendant generally....
To support his decision Brantly relied entirely on two early California
cases, People v. Smith and People v. Jefferson." In the Smith case the
Supreme Court of California stated:
Neither one of these specific offenses, made specific by the hour of
its commission, can be said to be contained in the other. The rea-
soning applicable to convictions under indictments in murder cases
is not at all in point. The presence or4 absence of malice, delibera-
tion, and premeditation there fixes the degree of the crime, while
here the degree is fixed by the hour of its commission. The gravity
of the punishment is no element in determining whether the es-
sentials of one crime are embraced within another charge.
The other California case, People v. Jefferson,' reads in part as follows:
But while a defendant indicted for one crime may be convicted of
a less offense also charged in the indictment, he cannot be convicted
of an offense not charged in the indictment (actually or by con-
struction created by the legislative will) and which consists of an
additional element of circumstances not averred in the indictment.
Prior to the amendments referred to, an indictment charging an
entry in the nighttime could not be construed as averring an entry
in the daytime; and as there was no allegation of an entry in the
daytime, a defendant accused of "burglary" could not be con-
victed of "housebreaking."
The California court further states that by the California Code, whenever
a crime is distinguished into degrees, the jury or court upon convicting must
find the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty; that under
this procedure, it would be illogical, and not in accord with elementary
1136 Cal. 207, 68 Pac. 702 (1902).
652 Cal. 452 (1877).
'52 Cal. 452 (1877).
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principles of pleading, to declare that if the indictment charged an entry
in the nighttime only, the jury or court could find the defendant guilty of
an entry in the daytime. Inasmuch as the indictment, to cover both degrees,
must not specify either that the entry was by day or by night, it follows
that the averment must be construed as charging an entry both in the
nighttime and daytime.
These two California cases were decided on the basis of two California
Code sections' which are also found in the Montana Code,' as follows:
94-7406. Jury to find degree of crime. Whenever a crime is dis-
tinguished into degrees, the jury, if they convict the defendant,
must find the degree of the crime of which he is guilty.
94-7408. Jury may convict of lesser offense or of attempt. The
jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission
of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged,
or of an attempt to commit the offense.
In order to achieve the result he desired in the Copenhaver case, Brant-
]y distinguished the leading Iowa case of State v. Jordan° from the two
California cases. He declared the case not in point, even though the fact
situation was identical to that in the Copenhaver case because it was decided
under a statute which declared:
Upon an indictment for an offense consisting of different degrees,
the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in
the indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an
attempt to commit the offense if punishable by indictment. (Em-
phasis added.)
It is submitted that it was with this handling of the Jordan case that
Brantly erred. He insisted that the Montana statute most nearly corre-
sponding to the Iowa statute was the above section 94-7408, and that it is
different in substance because it limits the conviction to such inferior crimes
as are necessarily included in that with which the defendant is charged.
But Brantly failed to recognize that Montana has a Code section similar to
that found in State v. Jordan, separate and distinct from the two above
cited Montana and California Code sections. This section,' not found in
the California Code, reads as follows:
94-6428. Of what offense a defendant may be convicted. Upon
the trial of an indictment or information the defendant may be
convicted of the crime charged therein, or of a lesser degree of the
same crime, or of any crime included in the crime charged, or of an
attempt to commit the crime charged, or of an attempt to commit
a lesser degree of the crime charged, or of an attempt to commit
any crime included in the crime charged.
'CAI. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1157, 1159 (Deering 1949).
'R.C.M. 1947.
1087 Iowa 86,54 N.W. 63 (1893).
1187 Iowa 86, 54 N.W. 63 (1893).
"
2R.C.M. 1947. The Code section quoted in State v. Jordan, 8upra, is almost identical
to § 94-6428 in the respect that they both treat the handling of inferior or lesser
crimes in the same manner. It should also be noted that § 94-6428 is more compre-
hensive than the Iowa section as it also deals with included offenses as well as
lesser degrees of the same crime.
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We shall consider below the failure of both the Copenhaver and Fitz-
patrick cases to recognize the significance of this statute.
CRITIQUE OF PRESENT MONTANA LAW
The above discussion of the relevant California and Montana cases
establishes these three principles:
(1) Burglary may be charged either generally, or expressly as
either first degree or second degree burglary.
(2) On an express charge of first degree burglary there may
never be a conviction for second degree burglary.
(3) The only time the judge or jury has any choice as to the de-
gree of burglary of which the defendant may be convicted, is
when the indictment or information charges burglary gen-
erally.'
The first proposition is declaratory of established practice generally
and is supported by the Montana Code and decisions thereunder." How-
ever, the second and third propositions, though apparently well accepted in
Montana at the present time, are not supported by the Montana Code. In
fact, they present on careful analysis the following three fallacies:
(1) First and second degree burglary as defined in our Code are
essentially two distinct crimes.
(2) A conviction of daytime burglary cannot be permitted on a
charge of nighttime burglary, even though by statute the for-
mer is only a degree of burglary, inferior to the latter.
(3) Second degree burglary is not an included offense in a charge
of first degree burglary.
In contradistinction to the fallacies above, it is submitted that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court should establish the following as the law of Montana:
(1) First and second degree burglary are degrees of the one crime
of burglary-the distinctions of time being merely for pur-
poses of varying the severity of the penalty.
(2) Second degree burglary is included in a charge of first degree
burglary.
(3) A conviction of second degree burglary may be allowed on a
charge of first degree burglary, as a lesser degree of the crime
charged.
It is believed that proper interpretation of the above quoted Montana
Code sections' requires the adoption of these three principles.
".... A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE . ..'"
As is noted in section 94-7408," the jury may find the defendant guilty
of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with
'Another possible alternative is the conviction of first degree burglary on a charge
of second degree burglary. Of course, a defendant is constitutionally protected
against the conviction of a more serious crime than that charged.
"R.C.M. 1947, tit. 94, c. 64. It has been generally conceded in Montana that an in-
dictment or Information may be in terms of the statute. Such an interpretation
would suggest the above contention since each degree as well as the general defini-
tion is in terms of the statute.
'rR.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-6428, 94-7406, 94-7408.
"iR,CM, 1947.
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which he is charged. We submit that the court should have found second
degree burglary to be an "included" offense under a charge of first degree
burglary under this section. The reason for its failure to do so is found in
the early California case which it considered controlling.
In this early case, People v. Jefferson," the distinction between burglary
and the other common law crimes, especially homicide, is largely based on
the ground that there were no degrees of burglary at common law, and that
the uniting of burglary and housebreaking in one Code section, while at-
tempting to make them one crime, did not have that effect when pleaded
specifically. By this reasoning, burglary is one crime if pleaded generally
and two distinct crimes if pleaded by degree-the distinction being the ele-
ment of time. The result is that because they were once two distinct crimes,
daytime burglary could not be included in a charge of nighttime burglary.
This distinction between -the degrees of burglary on the basis of time
alone is not a valid one for purposes of pleading, for the reason that burg-
lary has changed considerably from the form that it had at the common law.
The early common law defined burglary as (1) the breaking (2) and enter-
ing (3) of a dwelling house (4) of another (5) in the nighttime, (6) with
the intent to commit a felony therein. It was necessary to allege all six ele-
ments in the indictment to sustain a conviction.
Montana's first codification of burglary was a statement of this common
law definition with the exception that a breaking was not necessary if a door
or window were open.' Shortly thereafter, in 1871, ' burglary in the day-
time was added to the Code, and thus it became the intention of the legisla-
ture to have two crimes of burglary: (1) burglary in the nighttime or com-
mon law burglary, and (2) burglary in the daytime or housebreaking. In
1885, ' the legislature made a change in the codification of burglary which
has remained practically unchanged' until the present day. This modifica-
tion makes it conclusive that the legislature intended to unite the two crimes
of burglary and housebreaking into one crime, for the Code now defines
burglary generally in a single section, with a subsequent section dividing the
crime into degrees on the basis of the time of commission so as to vary the
penalty.
Such a distinction between degrees of a crime for purposes of punish-
ment is not new. The statutory modifications of murder, larceny, assault
and other crimes went through a parallel development. For instance, the
penalty for murder at common law was generally conceded to be death.
When people became humanitarian enough to realize that there were situa-
tions in which the death penalty was too severe for the taking of a human
life, they made new rules under which in certain circumstances the penalty
was lessened. Thus developed the division of homicide into first and second
degree murder and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The same sort
"52 Cal. 452 (1877).
'sState v. Copenhaver, 35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907) ; State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 15
P.2d 233 (1932).
'
9Laws of Montana (Bannack), § 58 (1864).
2"MONT. COD. STAT. 1871, § 90.
'Laws of Montana 1885, § 90.
'Laws of Montana 1949, c. 126, § 1, amending R.C.M. 1947, § 94-901 to include the
word "automobile."
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of modification occurred in the crime of larceny which became petit and
grand larceny. Assault was given the same treatment, and, although there
is no express statute defining assault generally, the common law definition
provided the basis for the three statutory degrees of assault. In fact in
Montana, the actual labeling of the different kinds of assaults as degrees of
the crime came after that in burglary, thus further suggesting that the date
of codification into degrees is of little or no importance.'
The rule that burglary is one crime if pleaded generally and two dis-
tinct crimes if pleaded by degree is even more astonishing in view of the
fact that contrary rules have been approved, not only for all informations
charging first degree murder, but also for those charging grand larceny and
first or second degree assault. In State v. Copenhaver," Brantly distin-
guished homicide and the grades thereof from burglary and its degrees by
stating that in a homicide there is always a killing. He apparently refused
to recognize that the difference between first and second degree burglary
was not that there wasn't a burglary, but that it was not committed during
the time specifically alleged in the pleading.' The court has said, "There is
but one crime of murder, and its division into degrees is simply for the pur-
pose of adjusting the punishment 'with reference to the presence or absence
of- circumstances of aggravation.' " Likewise, for larceny, the Montana
courts have found, in effect, that except for purposes of punishment the ele-
ment of value is of small importance; and this element of value is the differ-
ence between grand and petit larceny.' Such division into degrees for pur-
poses of punishment has also been the measure between the degrees of as-
sault, and it is probably with this crime that the variation in penalty accord-
ing to degrees of aggravation is best defined.'
Consequently, the problem results from the fact that in burglary too
much emphasis is placed on a supposed substantive distinction between the
degrees. That such a distinction was once of importance in the pleading of
burglary and housebreaking should have no significance today because
burglary has in several respects become both procedurally and substantively
a different crime from either of the earlier crimes. Indeed, it can be argued
very persuasively that our statutory crime of burglary has not only ab-
sorbed the common law crimes of burglary and housebreaking but that it
differs in substance in several respects. For instance, at common law, bur-
glary was a crime solely against the habitation.' The fear of forcible in-
vasion of one's home at night with felonious purpose led to a very severe
penalty. There was then developed the desire to give protection to houses
and other buildings in the daytime as well as the nighttime, expressing an
increased interest and concern in the protection of economic interests gen-
erally. This led to creation of the crime of housebreaking. At this stage a*
"Burglary was labeled in terms of degree in 1885, while the labeling of assault came
in 1895.
"35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907).
"State v. Hliboka, 31 Mont. 455, 78 Pac. 956 (1904).
"This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the Montana courts readily convict
of petit larceny on acquittal of grand larceny.
"The elements of aggravation are the sole distinction between the different degrees
of assault; the more complex and serious the crime, the higher the degree of assault.
2JThis was true also under Con. STAT. 1871, c. 5.
1956] NOTES
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 18 [1956], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/8
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
primary distinction between "burglary" and" housebreaking" was the con-
cern in the former for the safety and welfare of the householder in the
nighttime and in the latter for the security of his property. The next leg-
islative stage was the enlarging of the statutory definition of burglary by
the merging of the two crimes as "burglary," thus protecting interests in
both person and property.' The important point to note in this legislative
development is that we have today a single statutory definition comprehend-
ing all of the earlier crimes.
Another distinction between the two is that under our statute "break-
inga" is never required as it was at the common law.' Moreover, as is indi-
cated in the general statutory definition of burglary, time is not of sub-
stantive importance. State v. Mish' curtly states that an information charg-
ing burglary need not allege the time of the entry or burglary. This like-
wise is the position of State v. Copenhaver and State v. Fitzpatrick.'
If our conclusions as to the substantive singleness of burglary as de-
fined by the statute are correct, it is submitted that there is a; basic conflict
between the rule governing murder, larceny, and assault and the rule gov-
erning burglary.
The pleading of murder at the common law was, of course, more com-
plicated than it is today, but there are several elements which are the same,
e.g., malice aforethought, unlawful killing and human being. When murder
was first divided into degrees by statute, the additional distinctive elements
of premeditation and deliberation were added to the definition for first de-
gree murder. Although the Montana courts laid down the rule that in an
information for murder it is sufficient merely to allege that the killing was
with malice aforethought, and that the elements of premeditation and delib-
eration are matters of proof,"' the courts frequently have held that on
charges of first degree murder a defendant could be convicted of second
"In extension of the crime of burglary to objects of property, two Montana cases,
State v. Green, 15 Mont. 424, 39 Pac. 322 (1895), and State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413,
15, P.2d 233 (1932), held respectively that the words "box car" and "sheep wagon"
were sufficiently definite forms of description. State v. Ebel stated explicity,
"While the language of the statute might have been made more definite and certain
by employing words in common use, it could not well have been made more compre-
hensive, and we think that the absence of more particular terms of description indi-
cates an intention, on the part of the legislature, to include every kind of buildings
or structures 'housed in' or roofed, regardless of the fact whether they are at the
time, or ever have been, inhabited by members of the human family." In addition
thereto, one must remember that when in 1949 the legislature included the word
"automobile" in its definition as being subject to burglary, it further substantiated
the position taken by the above quoted case.
"°State v. Copenhaver, 35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907).
"'36 Mont. 168, 92 Pac. 459 (1907).
'35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907).
'125 Mont. 448, 239 P.2d 529 (1952). The case of State v. Summers, 107 Mont. 34,
79 P.2d 560 (1938), strongly asserted that a burglary information in the usual form
was sufficient, notwithstanding that it failed to state the time when burglary was
alleged to have been committed, whether day or night, in view of defendant's right
to a bill of particulars if he deemed the information not sufficiently definite. How-
ever, the decision of State v. Bosch, 125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477 (1952), abolishing
the bill of particulars in Montana, and thus denying the rule of State v. Summers,
leaves the issue in utter confusion.
"'State v. McGowan, 36 Mont. 422, 93 Pac. 552 (1908) ; State v. Lu Sing, 34 Mont. 31,
85 Pac. 521 (1906) ; Territory v. Stears, 2 Mont. 324 (1875).
[Vol. 18,
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degree murder or even voluntary manslaughter.' Other cases have held
that either on a general charge of murder or on a charge of second degree
murder a defendant could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter.' This
reduction, from first degree to second degree, and from murder to man-
slaughter, is a good example of lesser included offenses; furthermore, the
treatment of involuntary manslaughter is entirely on the basis of lesser in-
cluded offenses since involuntary manslaughter is not a degree of murder.
It is merely associated with murder, since it, like murder, is a grade of
homicide. Thus the reasoning in these homicide cases of the various hom-
icide charges is fundamentally different from the rule governing the two
degrees of burglary in the Copenhaver and Fitzpatrick cases.
Larceny is likewise divided into degrees and, although the early Mon-
tana Codes provided for both grand and petit larceny, it was not until
1895,' that larceny was codified in its present form. Today larceny is first
defined generally and then described as being in degrees. Subsequently the
distinct degrees are defined. The principal difference between the two de-
grees, grand and petit, is the value of the property stolen. Reasoning from
the analysis already set forth in the discussion of burglary as to the forms
of pleading required by our court, it would seem that to be safe larceny
should be pleaded generally. But this has not been done consistently. The
courts have held that petit larceny is necessarily included in the greater
charge of grand larceny.' Consequently the state may safely charge grand
larceny although it is later able to prove only petit larceny.
Assault also is a crime in which the lesser offense is treated as an in-
cluded offense,' though there is no general statutory definition, nor has there
ever been in Montana. In fact, it was not even codified into degrees until
1895. Two years prior to this codification into degrees, the case of State v.
Eschback'" was decided. In this case, the defendant was informed against
for a felonious assault with a deadly weapon. The court under section 60
of the criminal statutes,' which described felonious assault with a deadly
weapon, stated that there were several elements necessary for this offense:
(1) an assault (2) with a deadly weapon (3) with the intent to inflict upon
the person of another a bodily injury, (4) where no considerable provoca-
tion appears or where the circumstances of the assault show an abandoned
and malignant heart. The information charged all the elements of the of-
fense, and the verdict of the jury found the defendant guilty of an assault
with a deadly weapon. The verdict indicated the presence of the first two
elements but it did not find the intent nor the malignant heart or absence of
provocation necessary for the felony. Therefore, the case was remanded
with instructions to assess a penalty for a simple assault, a misdemeanor,
'State v. Crean, 43 Mont. 47, 114 Pac. 603 (1911); State v. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52,
66 Pac. 508 (1901).
'*State v. Allison, 122 Mont. 120, 199 P.2d 279 (1948); State v. Gondeiro, 82 Mont. 530,
268 Pac. 507 (1928).
'7MONT. PEN. CODE 1895.
18tate v. Dimond, 82 Mont. 110, 265 Pac. 5 (1938).
8eState v. Farnham, 35 Mont. 375, 89 Pac. 728 (1907) ; State v. Eschback, 13 Mont.
399, 34 Pac. 179 (1893).
4013 Mont. 399, 34 Pac. 179 (1893).
"4th DIv. CoMP. STAT. 1887.
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rather than the felonious assault for which he had been sentenced. This
case shows that the lesser offense was included in the greater, and yet two
distinct and specific elements of the higher offense were alleged-two ele-
ments which, if present, would have required a conviction of aggravated
assault.
It is submitted that the preceding discussion conclusively establishes
that burglary is one crime, and that the degrees of burglary are not intend-
ed to be distinguished from one another except for purposes of punishment.
This result has been reached in three other crimes, homicide, larceny, and
assault. In each of these crimes the pleading of a higher degree will permit
conviction for a lesser degree. Yet, in each of these crimes there are ele-
ments of aggravation such as malice, value, assault with intent to kill, which
form the very basis of the crimes themselves-substantive elements. Each
is expressly written into the Code as the distinction between a higher and
a lower degree of a crime. But in the instance of burglary, time is not an
element of the substantive crime-it is merely the difference between the
two degrees of burglary as established by the Code. Giving the pleading of
burglary a treatment contrary and conflicting with that of these other
crimes results in erroneous and anomalous court-made law. Thus it is sub-
mitted that our court should adopt the rule that second degree burglary is
included in a charge of first degree burglary.
".. A LESSER DEGREE OF THE SAME CRIME ..
By way of introduction to this section, it must be recognized that there
are two arguments upon which a different result than that reached in the
Copenhaver and Fitzpatrick cases may be achieved. The first deals with
the question of "included offenses" under a burglary charge as developed
in both the Montana and California cases. That has been treated above.
This section deals with the argument that second degree burglary is a lesser
degree of first degree burglary and for that reason is simply a lesser degree
of burglary. If either of these arguments be established, Copenhaver and
Fitzpatrick should be reversed. It is submitted that both are valid.
The Copenhaver case recognized that there are two procedural sections
which govern the rendering of a verdict by a jury for a lesser degree of the
crime charged and a lesser included offense. Specific reference is made to
what are now sections 94-7406 and 94-7408, R.C.M. 1947. These same sec-
tions are also recognized by implication in State v. Fitzpatrick" and People
v. Smith' and expressly in People v. Jefferson." They are comprehensive
of the law in California since they are the only procedural sections in the
California Code governing this problem. This, however, is not true of the
Montana Code, since there is another section which bears directly on this
subject and which would have given, were it properly employed, an entirely
different perspective to this question. This is section 94-6428," quoted
supra, p. 88.
125 Mont. 448, 239 P.2d 529 (1952).
"136 Cal. 207, 68 Pac. 702 (1902).
452 Cal. 452 (1877).
"R.C.M. 1947.
[Vol. 18,
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NOTES
Section 94-6428 has an early history in Montana. It was found in the
Bannack Code, but was in two sections at that time." These sections were:
100. Upon an indictment, for an offense consisting of different
degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree
charged in the indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior there-
to, or of an attempt to commit the offense.
101. In all other cases, the defendant may be found guilty of an
offense the commission of whichis n.eessarily included in that withu
which he is charged in the indictment.
These sections were codified into one, identical to section 94-6428, in the
Penal Code of 1895.
Section 94-7406" likewise has an early history. It appeared in a
somewhat similar form in section 196 of the Bannack Code, and was also
found in the California Code. It was later to be codified in the Penal
Code of 1895 in its present state.
However, section 94-7408' was first incorporated in the Penal Code
of 1895, borrowed from California. There was no early history on this
section. It is apparent then, that this section must be construed in the
light of both 94-6428 and 94-7406, since it was preceded by both, and
since it repealed neither section either expressly or by implication. How-
ever, in the Copenhaver case, Brantly did not recognize section 94-6428
as bearing on this issue of lesser degrees. Apparently he just overlooked
it. At any rate, his failure to read section 94-6428 together with the
other two sections caused him to give an unduly restrictive meaning to
the two sections considered. First he recognized section 94-7406 as
authorizing the jury to find the degree only on a general charge of bur-
glary, and section 94-7408 as authorizing the jury to find a defendant
guilty of a lesser offense of the same crime only when that lesser of-
fense is necessarily included in the more severe offense.
But, had Brantly recognized and utilized the Code sections as they
are today, he could only have made a different ruling. In fact, had he
analyzed and interpreted the three Code sections together, he would
have recognized the controlling effect of section 94-6428 on the other
two sections as follows:
(1) Section 94-6428 read together with section 94-7408 governs
lesser included offenses.
(2) Section 94-6428 read together with section 94-7406 governs
two propositions:
(A) A conviction of a lesser degree may be found on a
charge of a higher degree of the same crime.
(B) When a crime is charged generally, the degree of that
crime of which the defendant is guilty must be found.
Of course, proposition (2) (B) is obvious when one considers that
a verdict of guilty on a charge of killing with malice aforethought would
sustain no penalty until the jury had determined the degree. There is
"Laws of Montana (Bannack) §§ 100, 101 (1864).
"'R.C.M. 1947.
"Ibid.
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no punishment for murder, charged generally, but there is a penalty
for each of the degrees of murder. This is likewise true of the pleading
of burglary generally, and is one of the few valid propositions of the
Copenhaver and Fitzpatrick cases.
The proposition concerning lesser included offenses has previously
been discussed, but proposition (2) (A)-a conviction of a lesser degree
may be found on a charge of a higher degree of the same crime-is the
basis of our present discussion.
First of all, the question should be asked whether section 94-6428
even applies to the question of verdict and instructions. The answer,
of course, is that it must be read together with sections 94-7406 and
94-7408 since the Code is to be considered as a whole--one section to be
read in connection with, and in relation to all of the rest. State v. Alli-
san" illustrates that such consideration has been given in connection
with murder and manslaughter. While illustrating that involuntary
manslaughter is an included offense in a charge of second degree mur-
der, this case also involved the effect of section 94-6428 in connection with
lesser degrees. The defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the
second degree. The court advised the jury that it had taken from their
consideration the question of second degree murder, and that the only ques-
tion remaining for their consideration was the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant of the crime of manslaughter. In its instruction to the jury, the
court gave the statutory definition of manslaughter, both involuntary and
voluntary. The defendant conceded that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
degree of the crime charged in the information but insisted that involuntary
manslaughter was not included in the information which charged murder
in the second degree, and that therefore the defendant could not be convicted
of involuntary manslaughter of which the jury found him guilty. The court
found that involuntary manslaughter was an included offense in a charge
of second degree murder; but what is more important, it cites section
94-6428 as controlling both as to the question of lesser degrees of the same
crime and as to included offenses. The court held that although involuntary
manslaughter was not a lesser degree of murder under section 94-6428, as
characterized by the court, the conviction of the defendant was valid on the
ground that it is a lesser included offense. Thus this section of the Code
is used to limit the law governing variance, instructions and the duty of
the jury, illustrating that it has the power to, and does in fact, govern all
of these elements as well as do sections 94-7406 and 94-7408.
This proposition is further substantiated by State v. McDonald," which
discusses section 94-6428 in the following words:
'..The statute recognizes the rule, which prevails generally, that in
cases in which the charge preferred includes minor offenses or dif-
ferent degrees of the same crime, and the evidence is in such a con-
dition -that the jury may find the defendant guilty of a lower de-
gree than that charged, or of an included offense, it is incumbent
upon the court to so formulate the charges as to enable the jury to
find according to the view of what the evidence justifies.
"122 Mont. 120, 199 P.2d 279 (1948).
051 Mont. 1, 149 Pac. 279 (1915).
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Moreover, it is not only oversight of section 94-6428 which results in
error. Had the Montana Supreme Court analyzed the Iowa case of State v.
Jordan," and the Code section cited therein, it would have realized that that
Code section is in essence the same as section 94-6428 in regard to lesser de-
grees of the same crime. In fact, the section quoted in the Jordan case is
identical to section 100 of the Bannack Code and section 182 of the Codified
Statutes of 1871, which constitute an important nart of section 94-9498 as
we know it, and as it was at the time of State v. Copenhaver.'
Thus, it is conclusive that the Montana court erred in the Copenhaver
and Fitzpatrick cases by its failure to utilize section 94-6428. The adoption
of the rules of the two early California cases' as law for Montana was not
justified because in the California law there appears no provision equivalent
to section 94-6428. Section 94-6428 should govern burglary as well as any
other crime which is divided into degrees for purposes of punishment; and
the obvious failure to utilize it in this respect is subject to the strongest form
of criticism.
A BETTER RESULT?
As a result of the Copenhaver and Fitzpatrick cases a criminal may go
free behind a cloak of time. For example, a prosecutor may feel certain that
he has the defendant on a charge of first degree burglary, and pleads that
charge to make sure he avoids any problem which might arise from the re-
sult reached in State v. Bosch,' supra. The case is tried; the crime and the
defendant are linked together and proven; only the question of time is left.
Suppose a doubt is raised as to exactly what time it was committed, or the
evidence is conflicting, or the crime is proven to have been perpetrated one
minute after sunrise. Should this man go free? An affirmative answer is
untenable. No criminal should be shielded by the hands of a clock, or by
the rising and setting of the sun. A result which supports this conclusion
is defeating the aim of justice, and it is the more unjustifiable when such
a decision is restricted to a single crime. Moreover, the Code specifically
provides that a defendant may be convicted of a crime included in that
with which he is charged or of a lesser degree of the crime charged. These
two factors cannot be overlooked.
It is submitted that the proper way to determine the answer to this
pleading question is to consider sections 94-6428, 94-7406, and 94-7408 to-
gether. This will support the following conclusions:
(1) The jury may determine which degree of burglary the defendant
is guilty of on a general charge.
(2) The jury may, upon a specific charge of first degree burglary
convict of second degree burglary as a lesser degree of the crime
charged, if the evidence supports this result.
(3) The jury may, upon a specific charge of first degree burglary,
convict of second degree burglary as an offense included in the
higher charge.
'87 Iowa 86, 54 N.W. 64 (1893).
'35 Mont. 342, 89 Pac. 61 (1907).
'State v. Jordan, 87 Iowa 86, 54 N.W. 63 (1893) ; People v. Jefferson, 52 Cal. 452
(1877).
"125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477 (1952). See note 33 supra.
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These results are not new to the field of criminal procedure in Montana.
Illustrations of both lesser degrees and lesser included offenses in fields of
crime other than burglary have been given. Yet these crimes themselves
are, for the most part, no different from burglary, either procedurally or
substantively, as far as the Montana Code is concerned. The legislators have
done their part; but the courts have not retained in all respects the uni-
formity which was set before them. They have failed to weight correctly
the crime of burglary with other crimes of a similar nature. The result is
that second degree burglary has assumed an anomalous position among the
lesser degrees and offenses. But what is worse than error in this respect is
the failure of the court to utilize all of those procedural tools with which it
has been provided. Such is the case of section 94-6428 in relation to the
crime of burglary. The use of this section would conclusively reverse the
holdings of the Copenhaver and Fitzpatrick cases.
Thus it is submitted that the Montana courts should reject the rule de-
claring invalid a second degree burglary conviction, adopting instead a rule
conforming to those procedural rules developed under the Montana Code
in the crimes of homicide, larceny and assault.
MARSHALL H. MURRAY
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